"It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision…[as] far as the nature of the subject admits."1
Preface
For what follows, there are three things readers should know. First, I agree with the sentiment, attributed to Aristotle that, "It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it." Second, before refuting a position which one does not hold, one should understand the position well enough to be able to defend it as his own, well enough indeed to be accused of holding the position himself. Third, clarity is more important than agreement, and should be the chief goal of all parties to any dispute.2
Introduction
In his Nichomachean Ethics, just before turning to a critique of his teacher and friend, Plato, Aristotle prefaces his remarks as follows:
We had perhaps…consider the universal good and discuss…what is meant by it, although such an inquiry is made an uphill one by the fact that the forms have been introduced by friends of ours. Yet it would…be better, indeed to be our duty, for the sake of the truth, even to destroy what touches us most closely, especially as we are philosophers; for, while both are dear, piety requires us to honor truth above our friends.3
It is relatively easy to be critical of arguments articulated by strangers or, if not strangers, people for whom we have little to no respect. If we are honest, we relish opportunities to be critical, perhaps seek them out, even contrive them; and this is true even if we agree with the conclusion, finding fault only with the reasoning itself. We want to be critical, frankly. It goes against the grain, however, to be critical of people we respect, people with whom we would prefer to be in complete agreement. If we are honest, we disdain opportunities to be critical, perhaps circumvent them, steelman their arguments for them. We may even make excuses for them. (Well, he was shooting from the hip, you know, not like it was a formal setting, after all.) Again: even if we agree with the conclusion, finding fault only with the reasoning.
Going against the grain is where I find myself after watching Dr R Scott Clark's surprisingly controversial appearance on the Bablyon Bee. Dr Clark positioned a few arguments against Christian nationalism, one in particular which is less persuasive than it is thought to be, and in fact does no harm to the Christian nationalist case at all, really. This particular argument is that Christians, when engaging in political action, should prefer to apply the natural law rather than the moral, because the natural provides a basis upon which both Christians and non-Christians can co-exist. And in reply to anyone who would object or claim not to believe in natural law, Dr Clark would reply, first, “Then you are not an American,” and second, “You are insane.” I agree (with the insanity part) but that is to miss at least one point in the Christian nationalist view of present circumstances: The people who do not believe in natural law – the insane – are running this country, and they hate America.
What I wish to argue here is that, even on the hypothesis that we should apply the natural law, it cannot be for the sake of co-existence. There are at least three problems with the claim: (i) this co-existence is coincidental, superficial, and at the leisure of the unbeliever (who hates God’s laws in the first place); and (ii) the substantial identity of both natural and moral law renders application of the former substantially indistinguishable from the latter; (iii) the nature of God’s law (natural or moral) actually renders it useless to the purpose co-existence. Therefore, application of the natural law does not shut the door on Christian nationalism (which I believe is Dr Clark’s position); application of the natural merely colors the sort of Christian nationalism anyone might advance.
I
The portion of Dr Clark’s discussion with which I wish to engage begins at about 17:20, where Dr Clark refers to Christian nationalism as cosplay, pretending something is going to happen which is never going to happen. This, dismissive, attitude is understandable, even if only for pragmatic reasons.4
But this dismissiveness requires tempering. One must take into account that Christian nationalists belong to at least two different types. The first type seem to believe that transforming the USA into a Christian nation (again) is only a matter of acquiring and maintaining cultural and political power, and employing them to win a few elections, and then simply continuing to win elections by holding onto and employing that cultural and political power. This form of Christian nationalism could perhaps be called nascent, popular front, Christian nationalism. If cosplay entails pretending that the end goal can be achieved within the lifetime of anyone now living (especially by merely “influencing” the culture and winning elections), then, yes, this sort of Christian nationalism is cosplay.
The second type of Christian nationalism is not so easily disregarded, I think. The best known front man for this form of Christian nationalism (since the passing of Rushdooney, Bahnsen and North), who must not be named, believes it will be decades, if not centuries, before there is anything like a Christian nation anywhere on the earth, certainly before the United States become one. Whatever the prospects, there is nothing cosplay about this sort of Christian nationalism: it seeks to be the antithesis to Cultural Marxism – Cultural Christian Nationalism, but without a long march through the institutions, which are beyond reclamation. They are as serious in their commitments as any Marxist, which is probably a good thing, because one shouldn't have to be a Christian nationalist to see that there are two serious contenders against Marxism. Christianity is one of them; Marxism may be preferable to the other. This type of Christian nationalism is the sort that produced western civilization, which is likely why it is so closely associated with culture war, and so vilified by western civilization’s cultured despisers.5
So, if we are talking about popular-front Christian nationalism, then, yes, it is very definitely cosplay. But if Dr Clark and others would dismiss any and all talk of Christian nationalism as cosplay, then I would have to disagree with the caricature, which, for some, might make for a good, if condescending, laugh. But the snub itself runs the risk of being dismissed as cosplay. Surely (at least for purposes of argument) it is as much cosplay to pretend that applying natural law6 is actually viable in the dissolute rot through which we are living, as many believe, including Dr Clark, who provides two examples of appeals to natural law which demonstrate its persuasive power and perennial applicability: (i) the Obama/Keynes debate of 2004 (at about 20:25), and (ii) Martin Luther King, Jr's "Letter from Birmingham Jail" (from around 20:25 to 22:35).7 These two examples (from hundreds of instances he could have cited) serve as evidence that Christians and non-Christians can co-exist on the basis of natural law. After all, there must be some shared ground between the two; and natural law, for many reasons (including its apparent neutrality), seems to be of greater utility than the moral.
Contrary to readers’ expectations at this point, I accept the applicability of the natural law (and I have taken my own share of verbal abuse from theonomists because of it): whether or not, as Dr Clark asserts, one is truly an American if he does not believe in natural law, one is certainly not Reformed if he does not believe in natural law. I would go on to say that one is not a Christian if one denies the natural law. Not only so, but I would also argue, by way of demonstrating the extent to which I accept the applicability of the natural law, that if one truly accepts the natural law, then one is a Christian; and if one who claims to accept the natural law is not a Christian, then he does not truly accept the natural law. That being the case, if one wants his nation truly to adopt the natural law, then one wants his nation to be a Christian nation. Especially is this the case when one considers that whether one adopts the moral law or the natural law, the work of that law will be the same.
So then, appeals to the natural law do not really undermine Christian nationalist claims. Such appeals would only require the Christian nationalist to apply the natural law, rather than the moral.
But doesn’t this, by definition, mean that you wouldn’t really have Christian nationalism since by definition Christian nationalism is the application of the moral law? The answer is no, not really.
II
Despite being an advocate for natural law theory, I think there are reasons to be skeptical of the claim that believers and unbelievers can co-exist on the basis of natural law. Christian theology, Reformed theology in particular, provides reasons for asking if the regenerate and the unregenerate can truly co-exist on the basis of any law revealed from God, natural or moral. The more truly descriptive term for the state of affairs should be mutual toleration – until unbelievers acquire enough political, economic, and cultural power to impose toleration on their ever more onerous terms. Such is the condition – The Rot -- in which we now find ourselves; and it cannot be described as co-existence. This should not surprise us: the unregenerate hate God and His laws, moral and natural.
The fact that God is the author of both the natural and the moral laws (both of which reflect his character) is important because, at least on occasion, arguments for the natural law as the basis for co-existence seem predicated upon a belief that the natural law is more lenient (perhaps even indulgent), and therefore less objectionable to unbelievers than the moral law. If this is true, then it requires us to believe that the natural law and the moral law are discrete bodies of law, one applicable to regenerate and unregenerate alike, the other applicable only to regenerate, a view which is difficult to distinguish from dispensationalism. The Reformed view, at least as it is expounded by theologians such as John Calvin and Francis Turretin, is that "the natural law...is the same in principle as the moral law, and the moral law is summarized in the Ten Commandments:
[The]…things contained in the two tables [of the Ten Commandments] are...dictated to us by that internal law, which…is...stamped on every heart. For conscience, instead of allowing us to stifle our perceptions, and sleep on without interruption, acts as an inward witness and monitor, reminds us of what we owe to God, points out the distinction between good and evil, and thereby convicts us of departure from duty. But man, being immured in the darkness of error, is scarcely able, by means of that natural law, to form any tolerable idea of the worship which is acceptable to God. At all events, he is very far from forming any correct knowledge of it. In addition to this, he is so swollen with arrogance and ambition, and so blinded with self-love, that he is unable to survey, and, as it were, descend into himself, that he may so learn to humble and abase himself, and confess his misery. Therefore, as a necessary remedy, both for our dullness and our contumacy, the Lord has given us his written Law, which, by its sure attestations, removes the obscurity of the law of nature, and also, by shaking off our lethargy, makes a more lively and permanent impression on our minds.8
[...]
[T]he moral law is the same as to substance with the natural, which is immutable and founded upon the rational nature; both because the sum of the law...is impressed upon man by nature and because all its precepts are derived from the light of nature and nothing is found in them which is not taught by sound reason; nothing which does not pertain to all nations in every age; nothing which is not necessary for human nature to follow in order to attain its end. Therefore, it ought to be of perpetual right because the rational nature is always the same and like itself. Hence what is founded upon it must also be such. If by the sin of man, the rational nature was changed in the concrete and subjectively, the law was not forthwith altered in the abstract and objectively.9
It can be argued, therefore, that the natural law cannot provide a means for the enemies of God and the family of God to co-exist any more than the moral law can do. The moral law is not given to provide the people of God with a unique standard of life, distinct from that for the unregenerate, but as a “necessary remedy…for our dullness and…contumacy.” Moreover, if believer and unbeliever truly can co-exist under the natural law, then they should also be capable of living together under the moral: the content of both is the same. Accordingly, it follows that the natural law should have the same effect on man as the moral law. The natural law, no less than the moral, should convict us all of sin. Moral law is distinct from natural in that it removes “the obscurity” of the natural; and it is, no doubt, this obscurity which makes the natural law preferable to the moral -- for unbelievers, that is. They believe they can maximize the performance envelope of the natural law’s obscurity and fashion loopholes which permit them the delusion of an excuse for disobedience, and a protection from God’s wrath. But the fabrication of these shelters is futile because, in terms of content; in terms of the requirements of the two bodies of the law – the law is one:
Now, as it is evident that the law of God which we call moral, is nothing else than the testimony of natural law, and of that conscience which God has [engraved] on the minds of men, the whole of this equity of which we now speak is prescribed in it. Hence it alone ought to be the aim, the rule, and the end of all laws.10
The fact is, the regenerate, longing to live obediently, and the unregenerate, longing to live disobediently, cannot co-exist for long. Not truly: co-existence will be on terms pressed by one upon the other, the only difference being who has the greater cultural influence, and the determination to effect compliance.11
III
If one wants to see how the application of the natural law enables believers and unbelievers to co-exist, one need look no further than the highly publicized exchange between Joe Rogan and Matt Walsh on the subject of same-sex marriage. Walsh presents what should have been a compelling natural law argument against; and, in fairness, Rogan deftly maximizes the obscurity of the natural law to great advantage.
When thinking about such discussions, one question which ought to come to mind is this. If someone is not persuaded by, "God, speaking in the Scriptures, says…," should we be surprised if he is not persuaded by, "God, speaking in the natural law, says…"? Likewise, is it likely that one who is not persuaded by, "God, speaking in the natural law, says…," will be persuaded by, "God, speaking in the Scriptures, says…"? Can anyone watching the Rogan/Walsh exchange imagine that Rogan, not persuaded by Walsh's appeal to the natural law, will accede to the demands of the moral law? Are we seriously to believe that someone who will not yield to the moral law will go weak in the knees for the natural? The unregenerate heart simply rebels against behavioral norms, regardless of where those norms are engraved. If it is from the heart that murder, adultery, immorality, stealing, falsehoods and all other offenses proceed, then it hardly matters where the proscriptions against these acts are inscribed. Whether inscribed in scripture or on the minds of men, the law does its work, just as St Paul says when he writes that "when Gentiles who do not have the Law instinctively perform the requirements of the Law...they show the work of the Law written in their hearts...."12 And that work of the Law, according to the Westminster standards, is: (i) informing us of God's will, and our duty to Him, (ii) directing and binding us to walk in accordance with that will, (iii) demonstrating the "sinful pollutions" of our hearts and lives, (v) bringing us to further conviction of sin and a clearer sight of the need we have of Christ.13 So, what St Paul says about the gentiles showing the work of the law makes no sense if the natural law and the moral law are not identical to each other in content.
There are many things which would make no sense if the natural law and the moral law are not identical. One example is Martin Luther King’s "Letter from the Birmingham Jail," which Dr Clark cited as an argument which relies for its persuasive power upon the natural law; and he challenged anyone to deny the letter's continuing persuasive power. One possible rejoinder would point to John Locke's natural law defense of slavery in his Second Treatise.14 A Christian nationalist could justly argue that Locke's natural law argument, as well as Aristotle's, should be as persuasive today as in the past. Perhaps not. But Dr Clark's appeal to King's "Letter" begs the question and tells us nothing. Dr Clark is attempting to demonstrate the applicability of the natural law by pointing to an argument crafted by a man who is simply assuming the natural law's applicability to be read by people who also assume the applicability of the natural law. In fact, logically, King would not have had to believe in either natural or moral law in order to craft the Letter: knowing his audience, he could have been engaged in some artful motivated reasoning, fashioning an argument he himself would never buy but which his audience would do.
But that is beside the current point.
“You see,” Dr Clark seems to be saying, “believers and unbelievers can co-exist on the basis of natural law, as demonstrated by the fact that they both find Dr King’s ‘Letter’ persuasive.” But even assenting to the claim that the “Letter” is still persuasive, it hardly testifies to the superiority (that is, in the sense of providing a common legal basis for co-existence) of the natural over the moral law. Given the identity of content, anyone truly persuaded by the natural law should have no difficulty being persuaded by the moral; and anyone not truly persuaded by the moral likely is not truly persuaded by the natural. Besides, the fact that one finds an argument persuasive may reveal more about the person appraising the argument than it does the argument itself. I certainly believe this to be the case for Christians who are persuaded by arguments grounded in Critical Race Theory, social justice, and so forth.15
This identity of content (which I may casually have mentioned a time or five) attenuates the effect of Dr Clark's challenge to theonomists, who want to apply the judicial laws of God (after everyone is converted, of course). "Go ahead," says Dr Clark (at around 23:40), the tenor being something like, "Good luck with that because that will never happen," which is the reason for characterizing Christian nationalism as cosplay. As I watched the video, I thought it a bit over-confident and that, as an historian, Dr Clark might have been more guarded: a great many things have occurred in history which were never going to happen, like American independence, to which he alluded several times.16 Be that as it may, one can imagine a Christian nationalist respond to Dr Clark’s belief that we will simply apply natural law. He (the Christian nationalist) will point to the Rogan/Walsh exchange (or any number of other examples) and claim that western civilization's descent into degeneracy demonstrates the futility of believing the regenerate and unregenerate can truly co-exist. “You want to apply the natural law?” he might ask. “Really? When? After the insane, natural-law-denying, America-hating zombies return to reason? Go ahead. No, really, go ahead.” Sympathetic as I am to natural law theory, there would be some warrant for this caustic retort.
Before moving on, I want note something incongruous about Dr Clark’s appeal to natural law, as opposed to moral, for purposes of co-existence: his appeal (insofar as I understand it) is not to some generic natural law tradition, certainly not the Greco-Roman natural law tradition, but to a tradition fashioned by Christian theologians and philosophers during the medieval period, given its final synthesis by Thomas Aquinas, inherited (with emendations) by the Reformers and maintained by Catholic and Protestant thinkers. The political philosophy expressed in documents such as the Declaration of Independence, that the purpose of government is to secure rights, is not Greco-Roman; it is neither Platonic nor Aristotelian. It is more Romans 13 than it is the Republic or the Politics. In many respects, the Christian natural law tradition corrects errors in pagan understandings of natural law. And these errors were corrected by reflecting upon the moral law revealed in Scripture, grace perfecting nature, as it were.
But then, that was not as incongruous as his chastising Oklahoma governor Kevin Stitt for claiming his state for Jesus (at about 30:25). Dr Clark is rightly very concerned for how Jews and Muslims might feel about the claim. But then, within a few minutes, Dr Clark had a “news flash” for Governor Stitt: Jesus already owns the state of Oklahoma. Apparently, the same Jews and Muslims bothered by a governor claiming his state for Christ would not be offended by Christ claiming that state for Himself. Now, the only reason this is worth noting (to me) is that, on Dr Clark’s view, Stitt’s prayer, claiming his state for Christ, is an act of Christian nationalism, but believing that Jesus already owns the state, is not Christian nationalism. That strikes me as a strange position to hold, unless I misunderstand it, which is certainly possible.17
IV
The argument I have presented here — that natural law theory does not foreclose Christian nationalism per se, only certain forms of it — opens me to the “accusation” of being a Christian nationalist, and a theonomistic one at that. Surely, arguing the identity of the natural and moral laws is an attempt at getting theonomy in through the back door of natural law instead of general equity (the usual theonomist tactic).
I am in fact not a Christian nationalist, at least not in the sense that I would commit to any of the forms of it which have been offered by anyone during the last several decades, mostly because those forms have been promulgated by theonomists; and I am not a theonomist. But I am sympathetic to the idea, depending upon how it is understood. I would hold, with Dr Clark, that if Christian nationalism entails the establishment of a state religion or state visible church18 then I would reject such an idea, which points to at least one reason I am merely sympathetic, rather than committed to the idea: in the absence of a state (or national) church – that is, in the absence of some firm confessional commitments -- what exactly would a Christian nation be? Generically evangelical? Then I am not a fan: the problem with Protestantism in this country is evangelicalism. Evangelicals cannot keep their institutions from descending into degeneracy, why in the world would anyone want them running a country? Would it be a generic Nicene-Constantinopolitan Christianity? That might be less of a problem than evangelicalism, even if only because it is definitively creedal and confessional. But, while it would keep out explicitly heretical groups such as Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, oneness Pentecostals, it would still be a problem for some Protestants and for many Catholics and Orthodox: each could object to this settlement because it lets in the other two.
Well then, if I am not a Christian nationalist; if I am not one of the people Dr Clark is criticizing; if I am not a theonomist – then why have I bothered about this, and in such detail? I don’t know how important a role it plays, but, as a libertarian, I am frequently told that libertarianism is cosplay, especially since my brand of libertarianism has been close to the anarcho-capitalism promoted by Greg Baus and Kerry Baldwin. And then there’s my Texan nationalism. So, I am inclined to take it seriously when something or someone is dismissed as cosplay, larping, etc, and ask, “Is that really a fair assessment?” and, if so, “How might it be improved?” (assuming it should be). There is also the fact that calling someone’s political commitments cosplay is an insult, not an argument; and employing the insult as a justification for refusing to debate, simply adds injury to insult.
Also, and more important than my defensiveness about libertarianism, I have done so because the subject isn’t going away anytime soon. In fact, though talk of Christian nationalism, in its current manifestation is decades old, I believe we are just getting started, and should anyone manage to fashion a form of it that is not easily dismissed as reactionary, it will have to be taken seriously and won't be easily dismissed. As our civilization continues its downward spiral, as the stench of our cultural putrefaction becomes ever more unbearable (and noxious), the desire for solutions (likely, ever more desperate solutions) will only increase. Rather than being dismissive of, and condescending to people with understandable and legitimate fears, and desirous of some course of corrective action, rather than resignation and surrender, we need better conversations. I also don’t think it is wrong, stupid, silly, immoral, or even unbiblical to desire that one’s nation be Christian (depending upon how the term is defined), however unlikely it may be. I also don’t believe anyone is obligated to receive the Founders’ view of natural law, and be held somehow accountable for not doing so.19 I do believe, however, that much of the condescension towards people with Christian nationalist views is aimed at the front men, one in particular (who shall not be named), whose own condescension toward critics begs for rejoinder in kind. But if we are to have those better discussions, then this is not the way.
I have also done so, because, as I have admitted, I am somewhat amenable to “something like” Christian nationalism, that is, the sort of which Kevin DeYoung speaks favorably in his review of Wolfe’s book:
I understand and sympathize with the desire for something like Christian Nationalism...
I lament that America is much less Christian than it used to be. I want Christians in the fray, not simply negotiating the terms of our surrender. I want Christian people and Christian ideas to influence our nation for good. I pray for Christ and his kingdom to come. I want godly and wise magistrates. I want to see the sexual revolution turned back.
I love my nation and want to see it become more Christian—mostly by regeneration, but also by the good that comes from cultural Christianity. We should pray and labor for all of that. I just don’t think that equals Christian Nationalism as it has now been offered to us.
The problem is not that there are Christians who are desirous of a Christian nation (or something like it); or, at least, that is not the greatest problem. There are several greater problems: (i) many of the “desirous”, even the best behaved, are actually revanchist agitators;20 (ii) as revanchists, committed to reconquering lost territory, they are characterized more by partisan passion rather than sober restraint, susceptible to demagoguery; (iii) the circumstances under which it could be achievable are a long way off, for which the "desirous" -- impatient as they are -- are ill-prepared; (iv) Christians, especially evangelicals, demonstrably eager to ape the general culture, are not up to the task of cultural leadership; and (v) the Christian nationalism being offered is the wrong sort, as Kevin DeYoung observed. That sort of Christian nationalism may be the Christian nationalism we deserve (and I mean that in a bad way); but it is not the sort of Christian nationalism we need.21
But we aren’t going to get the Christian nationalism we need without writing about it, talking about it, arguing about it (intelligently and rationally), or even engaging in some cosplay in order to clarify and sharpen our thinking, to improve our mutual understanding of the issues at bar, without raising a generation capable of cultural leadership. It may be the case that all talk of Christian nationalism entails pretending that something is going to happen that is not, certainly not anytime soon. On this view of it, one wouldn’t need to oppose Christian nationalism in order to dismiss some form of it as playing make-believe. One could very well be all for a Christian nation, and say, “I would love it if it did happen; but it isn’t going to happen. People will never go for it, so we might as well not even talk about it. And anybody who does talk about it is wasting time better spent on evangelism.” One is free to take that entirely understandable course.
One is also free to take a different course, a course which does not ask whether people will go for it or speculate about whether it will ever happen. For one thing the question should never really be whether people will go for it, but about the circumstances under which they just might do. For another thing, nothing ever just happens; things happen in accordance with God’s providence, which includes the results of human action. American independence didn’t just happen; it was the result of human action. Civil rights didn’t just happen; they were the result of human action. BREXIT, also once dismissed as cosplay, something else that was never going to happen, didn’t just happen. It also was the result of human action.
The different course of action I have in mind, thinking of DeYoung’s desire to see his nation become more Christian (primarily through regeneration), looking and thinking ahead, asks, “What should a country in which Christians have achieved cultural leadership look like? What sort of culture should it produce? How will its governing authorities relate to the people over whom they watch as God’s deacons, punishing evil doers? What, exactly, would make a nation a Christian nation, simply applying the judicial laws and suppressing non-Christian religions?” More than likely, it will be decades, if not centuries, before the answers to these questions will matter. But there is nothing wrong with discussing those questions long before the answers are needed.
Christian nationalism may justly be dismissed as cosplay, for now. But as it becomes more serious, asking better questions and seeking better answers – having better discussions -- it just might begin to look less like cosplay and more like wargaming. And while wargaming does not guarantee success, it can certainly help. So, a bit of cosplay, a bit of larping, a bit of wargaming may be the best the way to help some future generation of Christians to have the (“something like”) Christian nationalism they need. More importantly, this “cosplay”, if nothing else, may lead – must lead – Christians to greater knowledge of ourselves and our God, as definite prerequisites for cultural leadership, if indeed that is to happen.
So yes, today, Christian nationalism is cosplay. And that’s okay.
I will discuss the sort of Christian nationalism I believe we need in a subsequent article.
Aristotle, (Nicomachean Ethics, Α. 1094α24).
I believe it is important for a Calvinist to have something very much like this approach if for no other reason than because it is consistent with Calvin’s observation that all of our true knowledge is either of ourselves or of God; and the two are so related that increasing knowledge of the one results in increasing knowledge of the other. As much as we enjoy "winning" an argument, there are more important things which can be accomplished, win, lose, or draw. And two of those things are (i) to know ourselves better and (ii) to know our God better. See Institutes, 1.1.1.
At 1.6.1 (1096a1), emphasis added.
One such reason is that the level of degeneracy in the US is such that, even if all Christians could agree on the applicability of the law of God (specifically, the general equity thereof) it wouldn’t matter. Americans are closer to voting for full-orbbed socialism than they will be for Christian nationalism, however the term be defined.
There are, on the other hand, at least four reasons for vilification from the Right: (i) the Right is populated by a great many non-Christians who object to being informed (or so they believe) that there will be no place for them in the political life of a Christian America; (ii) Christians of the Right do not believe the Scriptures teach what Christian nationalists claim that they teach regarding national polity; (iii) the front men for Christian nationalism (condescending, derisive, truculent) are not the most winsome; (iv) Christian nationalism seems as much at odds with the American Tradition as the Marxism (and other evils) it endeavors to seek and destroy.
Dr Clark raises the matter of natural law at about 19:30, during the course of which, he asserts that if one does not believe in natural law, then one is not an American and enjoins us all to read the Declaration of Independence.
Strictly speaking God’s laws are perennially applicable. But here I am referring to the temporal applicability of the natural law as a basis for co-existence between believers and non-believers.
Calvin, Institutes, 2.8.1, emphases added.
Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 11.2.17.
Calvin, Institutes, 4.20.16, emphasis added.
On the subject of cultural influence, it is relevant, in view of the scandalous sexual sins plaguing the Church, to take note of the work of JD Unwin, Sex and Civilization. Unwin argues that the group of people in any civilization which exercises the strictest sexual restraint will possess the bulk of cultural and political power and influence, even if they constitute a numerical minority. The reason for this is that the energy required for building and maintaining civilization is sexual in nature. Sexual restraint means that the energy is channeled and applied elsewhere, that is, to those activities which are required for building and maintaining civilization, including, at the basic level the formation and preservation of stable families. This suggests that at least one very important cause for Christians’ loss of influence in the US, may be is a laxity in sexual restraint, which seems to track with the general culture. At the present stage of civilizational decline, therefore, if we wish to know who will be running — or rebuilding — things in the future, we need to look at which demographic is exhibiting the most sexual restraint, rather than who is simply having more babies. On this note, Mary Eberstadt (who has written much on the effects of the sexual revolution) argued, in her 2013 book, How the West Really Lost God: A New Theory of Secularization (West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton, 2013), that the decline in church-going in the west is the result of the collapse of the western family than other supposed reasons.
Romans 2.14-15, emphasis added.
See Westminster Confession of Faith, 19.6; cf. Romans 7.7-11.
See James Farr, "Locke, Natural Law and New World Slavery," Political Theory, Vol. 36, No. 4, August 2008, 495 - 522. It is true that Locke's defense was of slavery as a consequence of just war, but as Calvin noted the natural law is attended by a great deal of obscurity, an obscurity sufficient for Aristotle to justify slavery on the grounds that some people were simply natural slaves, an argument repeated by proponents of slavery in the USA. See Politics, 1.5, 1254b20-23.
Disclosure: I do not deny the Letter’s continuing persuasive power. Members of the Senate took it in turns to read from the Letter on the floor of the Senate during the 9 April 2019 commemorative reading of the letter. I would argue that the letter’s appeal was not simply to natural law but also to moral; that is, King’s argument was an artful weaving of natural and moral law, not surprising given they are identical. I don’t think the argument would have been successful had it been grounded solely on natural law, if it truly was so grounded. I would cite one passage which raises the question whether King intended to argue solely on the basis of the natural law, or even saw an operative disjunction between the two:
“Now, what is the difference between the two? How does one determine whether a law is just or unjust? A just law is a man made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law.”
Something else that was not supposed to happen (or, at least, not when and how it was supposed to happen) was the end of the Soviet Union. On the very day (9 November 1989) that Germans began chipping away at the Berlin Wall, (West) German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, in a conversation with Lech Walesa about the circumstances in the Soviet bloc, told the Walesa that he (Kohl) would not live long enough to see German reunification. A great many people, who thought German reunification was cosplay, had heaping helpings of crow to choke down. In fairness, the fall of the Wall was due to serendipitous human error. And in just over two years, the Soviet Union was gone and history came to an end.
Possibly, Dr Clark would distinguish as follows: Stitt is completely free to pray, claiming Oklahoma for Jesus in his capacity as a private citizen, but not in his capacity as governor, in which capacity, he is not permitted to offend tax-paying non-Christians. Dr Clark, then, is free to offend the same tax-paying non-Christians because he does not do so in any official capacity. With all due respect to Dr Clark, if that is the argument, then it seems a bit weak.
When asked at which point Christian participation in a nation's political life becomes Christian nationalism, Dr Clark replied that point is reached when the activism includes agitating for an established church (at 29:53). To this, He-Who-Must-Not-Be-Named, retorted, "We already have a state religion." And he is not alone.
I mention this because at a point in the Babylon Bee discussion, Dr Clark was asked if it was his contention that the natural law provides the necessary common ground for co-existence, and he replied, “It’s the founders’ contention.” I have to confess to a Voldemort moment: My first visceral reaction was, “So what?” If we are to be proponents of natural law, then it should be because the Scriptures enjoin us to be, not because the Founders do so. If our reply to Christian nationalists who ask, “Why natural law?” is going to be, “Because the Founders say so,” then the arguments against Christian nationalism grow weaker by the moment.
Dr Clark alludes to this, when he refers to them (at around 15:25) as people who remember Christendom and want it back.
Why do we need any sort of Christian nationalism? Strictly speaking, we don’t. But I do believe that if, by the grace of God, the “revival” (or next “great” awakening) that so many are praying for does come, then the number of conversions could mean that there will be (for lack of better terms) something like Christian nationalism, in which case, it should be the best possible sort, rather than the worst.
A simply masterful response to the issue. Aside from seeing more new words than I am accustomed to, I enjoyed the veiled Harry Potter references to the 'other' Presbyterian Wilson. One observation from your remarks, which may be an error on my part: it appears that God's law must be understood as an inverted pyramid. He gave us a detailed specificity in His law in the garden, then a more generalized view in the Moral Law and then an even more generalized view in the Natural Law, culminating the final goal of the law - the revelation of Christ as law over all creation. Whereas unregenerate man tends to express law in evolutionary categories, masking his every growing desires to be free of God, by claiming an evolving (and thereby better) law from no-law in the primitive, to the now modern legal understanding we have thrusted upon us, which is really incoherent hedonism - that which is summed up in the the words "hath God said?". If this is true, then the notion of the regenerate seeking some kind of middle ground, or Kellerinian third way, with the unregenerate is absurd on its face, possibly even insane.